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on the solvency of some European States. At the heart of this crisis of con…dence on sovereign debt is the European Union (EU) and, in particular, the Eurozone due to the unsatisfactory performance of some of its member states, the so-called PIGS: Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain, even though with varying degrees of severity and in di¤erent stages of its development.
These concerns are strong barriers to the full normalization of the workings of the …nancial markets worldwide, in addition to being a serious obstacle to a faster and stronger economic recovery. Besides, they have generated a good deal of stress in the cohesion of the Eurozone itself, openly revealing disparate approaches to the solution of the problem by the member states while, at the same time, leading the European Central Bank (ECB) to adopt highly controversial measures in support of the Eurosystem. One such measure is the programme to purchase public debt issued by the member states experiencing the most severe di¢ culties in that respect which, in fact, amounts to indirect monetization of public de…cits. In short, what is being put into question is the con…guration and workings of the Eurozone itself and even the survival of the common currency in the near future.
There is an abundant and diversi…ed theoretical and empirical economic literature that attempts at explaining governments'positive …scal behavior, dating back to the well-known Wagner's law of increasing expenditures to the present day. In the whole, that literature emphasizes economic, institutional, demographic and political variables as the driving forces behind not only the secular growth of the public sector in modern market economies, but also of the asymmetric nature of discretionary …scal policies over the business cycle, as well as between revenues and expenditures expected behavior throughout the cycle. Another interesting aspect analyzed by this literature, initially in the case of Latin American countries in the sixties and, more recently, among industrialized countries, is the procyclicality of those policies. However, at least to the best of our knowledge, the impact of …scal rules, such as restrains on the public de…cit, on the stock of sovereign debt and on the power to borrow as a proportion to GDP, on the dependent …scal variables has received much less attention from the empirical literature.
This apparently widespread abstraction from the role played by …scal policy reaction functions and their e¤ects on key economic variables is somewhat di¢ cult to comprehend given the familiar rules imposed by the Maastricht Treaty and by the Stability and Growth Pact on the Eurozone member states.
Given that the center of the public debt crisis is the Eurozone, the main goal of this paper is to identify signi…cant di¤erences of regime on public expenditures, total revenues and tax revenues between the so-called PIGS and the remaining Eurozone member states, which might o¤er some clues on why the former are confronted with so serious problems from which the latter are apparently exempted. The comprehensive model we rely on, besides testing for the e¤ective implementation of …scal rules, also incorporates variables for the economic, political, demographic, and institutional dimensions taken into account by the most signi…cant theoretical contributions on positive public …nances.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y reviews the underlying literature. In section 3 we refer to the model and the data set. In section 4 we discuss the estimated results, and in section 5 we draw some …nal conclusions.
The Determinants of Fiscal Policy
We consider the unemployment rate and trade openness in the period as the economic determinants of …scal policy. The output gap is an alternative to the unemployment rate; however, our hypothesis is that the latter variable is not just an automatic stabilizer, like the output gap, but has the potential to enforce discretionary …scal policies due to its greater public awareness and social and political signi…cance to which politicians feel obliged to respond.
According to the Keynesian perspective of macroeconomic stabilization, we should observe a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and tax revenues, and the inverse relationship with public expenditures. Likewise, that relationship follows from the neoclassical tax-smoothing hypothesis, provided budget imbalances are temporary, in order to minimize inter-temporal social welfare losses from taxation for a given path of government spending (Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Roubini and Sachs, 1989, among others) . However, numerous empirical papers have detected procyclical …scal policies instead; Gavin et al. (1996) , Aizenman et al. (1996) and others have uncovered empirical evidence of procyclicality in Latin American countries, which they explain by access restrictions to capital markets by those countries during recessions. Talvi and Végh (2005) …nd that procyclicality is the rule rather than the exception and applies to industrialized countries as well, with the possible exception of the G-7 nations. But now the explanatory hypothesis put forward is the higher tax base volatility in developing countries and the ensuing management of public revenues and expenditures to minimize welfare losses on the face of pressures from interest groups to increase spending during booms and otherwise during recessions. Close to this hypothesis is the so-called voracity e¤ect proposed by Tornell and Lane (1999) which states that during upturns the various constituencies compete for a share in the growing tax revenues such that expenditures increase more than proportionally to income. This last line of thought introduces asymmetric behavior of discretionary …scal policies throughout the cycle, that is, countercyclical during recessions but procyclical during growth periods; Hercowitz and Strawczynski (2004) refer to it as the cyclical ratcheting in government spending. Finally, Manasse (2006) concludes that …scal policy is acyclical over downturns but strongly procyclical in good times.
Trade openness is a variable very often present in these models since early times. Cameron (1978) includes it as part of the international explanation of the expansion of the public sector. A …rst line of reasoning considers that open economies are exposed to world markets ‡uctuations out of their control and, therefore, are subject to increased volatility of the business cycle.
A way to manage this higher risk is through increased government intervention in the economy with particular emphasis on the social sector, as pointed out by Myrdal (1960) , Lindbeck (1975) , Rodrik (1998) and others. Accordingly, it should be expected state expenditures to increase through subsidies to unemployed workers and to enterprises to retrain and retain workers in 5 bad times, and through larger public employment. However, this analysis abstracts from the implications of increased international economic integration, competition, and the progressive dismantling of tari¤ barriers, which tear down the e¤ectiveness of those attempts to insulate national economies from unfavorable outside events. Therefore, these latter circumstances could reduce both revenues and public expenditures and, accordingly, change the expected signs of the coe¢ cients. Interestingly enough, Cameron (1978) sets the transmission mechanisms of that variable in such a manner that puts into play institutional and political forces, i.e., open economies possess highly concentrated industrial sectors favoring the development of strong labor unions and confederations that, in turn, provide labor and social-democratic parties their electoral bases to whose demands they must respond.
Budgetary procedures and …scal rules aimed at constraining government behavior have been the focus of both theoretical and some empirical contributions by authors such as Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) , and Hallerberg et al. (2001 and Hallerberg et al. ( , 2007 within the context of EMU and the Stability and Growth
Pact. In what concerns procedures, they distinguish between the delegation and contract approaches implying concepts similar to the hierarchical and collegial institutions referred to by Alesina and Perotti (1996) Following the tradition of the public choice literature on the median voter and interest groups (Olson, 1965; Becker, 1976; Meltzer and Richard, 1981, and many others) we analyze the e¤ect the following demographic and institutional variables: the fraction of elderly population, and union density. In average, members of both groups have incomes equal or lower than median income which, following Meltzer and Richard (1984) , is lower than average income. These groups favor income redistribution to their bene…t and vote on political parties that respond positively to them. Besides, the bias towards de…cit spending is supposed to increase with the aging of the population, leading to future tax increases that a¤ect future generations (Sussmuth and Weizsacker, 2006) as present ones lack altruism. And, as a matter of fact, in the last forty years or so the composition of government spending has evolved away from the purchase of goods and services towards unilateral transfers.
The associated impact on tax revenues is much less well studied in the literature but it seems reasonable to assume that, if at all, they should increase less than proportionally to welfare state expenditures.
We consider political fragmentation as a potential driving force behind government spending. In this sense the budget is a product of the competition among di¤erent political constituencies for budgetary bene…ts. Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) distinguish between political fragmentation, either the number of parties in the coalition (the legislative interpretation) or the number of spending ministers (the executive interpretation), and institutional fragmentation dealing with di¤erent budgetary procedures 1 and …scal discipline rules (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Hallerberg et al., 2007) . Political fragmentation transforms the budgetary process into a common good since bene…ts are highly concentrated on the bene…ciary interest groups whereas costs are spread all over. Higher fragmentation tends to be synonymous with government weakness and produce higher expenditure and higher de…cits, as shown in the seminal paper by Roubini and Sachs (1989) , Hallerberg and Strauch (2002), and others. The expected impact on tax revenues is less well established by the literature; for example, in the models developed by Weingast et al. (1981) the budget remains in balance implying that fragmentation acts on revenues in the same manner as it does on expenditures.
However, following Poterba (1994) we might think that the ability of governments to raise taxes and cut spending decreases with fragmentation but, in the presence of various approaches to this point we come to the conclusion that, indeed, the literature does not o¤er unequivocal indications on the effects of fragmentation on taxation. In addition, Lane (2003) …nds a positive procyclical relationship between spending and fragmentation. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) emphasize a closely related feature: whenever the winning party is randomly determined, or the party in power expects to loose the next elections, the government in o¢ ce tends to increase expenditures and debt, accordingly reducing the ability of its successor to implement its own programme.
The e¤ect of elections and the new ideological composition of the cabinet are considered to capture the possible in ‡uence of political business cycles (PBC) generated through …scal policy. This literature dates back to Nordhaus (1975) , MacRae (1977) and Hibbs (1977) Rogo¤ (1990) , Person and Tabellini (1990) , and Lohmann (1998) rede…ned the assumptions of the theory assuming rational voters with imperfect information. Now, the underlying rationale is that some important characteristics of politicians, like competence, are not directly observable by voters who can only infer about them through their retrospective valuation of economic outcomes. For example, if increased public spending is evaluated as a positive event because it generates output growth above a threshold value (Lohman, 1998), or if they succeed to raise expenditures in public goods …-nanced by the same tax revenue (Rogo¤ and Sibert, 1988) , or if government spending increases in immediately discernible consumption goods, though in detriment of investment (Rogo¤, 1990) , then incumbents are perceived as more capable than their competitors, and are re-elected. In what concerns taxes, these approaches agree that lower taxes are preferred to higher taxes.
As stated by Lohmann (1998), ". . . an incumbent of above-average quality is more likely to survive voter scrutiny. . . ". In these models politicians have an incentive to promote in ‡ationary policies before elections, even though future economic e¤ects are di¤erent.
On the other hand, enforcing transparent …scal rules restricting …scal de…cits, public debt or both to maximum values constraints the ability of incumbents to run explicit political budget cycles (Alt and Lassen, 2006) . In this case voters punish candidates who violate those rules. Instead, politicians can resort to changes in the composition of public expenditure, favoring special items such as those identi…ed with the welfare state; in fact, higher social expenditures during electoral periods …nd strong support in the literature (Drazen and Eslava, 2005) and, in this sense, we would now have cycles in the budget composition of expenditures to signal competence (Schneider, 2010) .
Considering the enormous diversity of the literature on this topic, plus the fact that we use aggregate data on …scal variables and all the empirical evidence on PBC is quite mixed (Schneider, 2010, p . 128), we do not have a priori expectations on the signi…cance and signs of the coe¢ cients to be 11 estimated.
Model and Data Set
A panel data approach, controlling for countries'and time …xed e¤ects 2 , is used to estimate the e¤ects of the cyclical state of the economy and of the two …scal rules imposed by the Maastricht Treaty on …scal variables:
where the …scal dependent variable for country i at time t, F i;t , is either general government outlays, total government revenues or total tax receipts, all of them evaluated as a proportion to GDP. In fact, total tax revenues evaluated in this manner turn out to be the e¤ective average tax rate. The paper focus on the reaction of these variables to the unemployment rate, Table 1 ). In so being, the sample covers both prior and subsequent time periods to the actual adoption of the Euro. Indeed, considering the requisites imposed by the Treaty of Maastricht, those countries took measures to adjust their economies in preparation for the new currency with a special emphasis on those intended for nominal convergence.
To account for a di¤erent reaction of the …scal variables to the unemployment rate and to the deviation from the …scal targets after the adoption of the Euro a multiplicative dummy variable, EU RO99 i;t , for each the main explanatory variables were introduced in the model. The dummy variable takes the values (0) for years before the adoption of the Euro, and (1) for years after the adoption of the Euro.
Finally, by means of a multiplicative form dummy, P IGS i;t ; the country sample is divided between the so-called PIGS and the remaining member states with respect to both …scal rules under consideration, plus the unemployment rate. As stated earlier, given that PIGS have experienced seriously unbalanced public …nances and face actual or market perceived insolvency crisis, this paper compares the …scal behavior of these two groups of countries in search for an explanation for the actual diverse situations in which they …nd themselves in the present Eurozone predicament.
The Estimated Results

Base Model Results
The results of the estimation for the baseline model are displayed in Tables   2, 3 and 4 -Equation (1). All the regressions are overall signi…cant and have high explanatory power.
The …rst striking results to be noticed are: a) in general, the estimated coe¢ cients on the government revenues and tax receipts equations are, in absolute value, smaller than those on outlays, showing that …scal policy is more 'potent'on the expenditure side than on the revenue side; b) the asymmetry of …scal policy is exposed by the positive signs of the highly signi…cant estimated coe¢ cients for the unemployment rate on expenditures and on both revenue measures, as well as for the estimated coe¢ cients for deviations of debt stock and government surplus from their targets.
In both instances the estimated coe¢ cients on the rate of unemployment are positive. Therefore, expenditures intended for macro-stabilization purposes, either through automatic stabilizers or discretionary policies, are anticyclical whereas revenues, mainly through the contribution of tax revenues, are pro-cyclical, even though with a substantially lower estimated coe¢ cient.
This result can also be inferred from Figures 1 to 3. Government expenditures are more correlated with the unemployment rate than government receipts and tax revenues. Our tentative explanation for this result, which is di¤erent from all others mentioned in the literature we know of, rests on the possible association between a progressive tax system and concentration of unemployment among lower income taxpayers. If this is the case, then higher income groups are the ones that gain the most and loose the least, respectively during booms and recessions. This is a very signi…cant outcome because even though budgetary policy is anti-cyclical as a whole, as conveyed by the whole set of the reported regression coe¢ cient estimates on the unemployment rate, the anti-cyclical e¤ectiveness of expenditures is signi…cantly weakened by the behavior of e¤ective tax rates and revenues. In case this tentative hypothesis is con…rmed by further empirical research, we would have an additional good reason to suggest the reform of the present day tax system in order to improve its ability to pursue macroeconomic stabilization goals.
Regarding …scal rules, deviations of the debt stock from the 60% target induce feeble expenditure adjustments, but there is no signi…cant reaction from total and tax revenues. Let's now turn to the other …scal rule. Deviations of the lagged one period budget surplus from the -3% target are negatively related to expenditures and positively related to total and tax revenues. These results mean that the …scal rule was not followed; instead, anti-cyclical policies persist over time with diminishing strength, moreover supporting the estimated net e¤ects mentioned above regarding unemployment.
Contrary to past predictions, but more in line with contemporary economic structural developments as envisaged by Vernon (1974) has increased much more among PIGS than with non-PIGS (see Figure 4) .
In a second step, and to account for a possible policy regime shift after the adoption of the Euro, we re-estimated our model di¤erentiating between the e¤ects of the main three variables on …scal policy before and after 1999.
The results are reported in Tables 2, 3 , and 4 -Equation (2). The reaction of …scal variables to the unemployment rate increases after 1999. That is, expenditures are more anti-cyclical, while revenues have become more procyclical.
Concerning the reaction of …scal variables to the deviations of the lagged debt stock from the 60% target, we do not found any regime shift on the expenditure side, but there is a signi…cant, although weak, increase on the tax revenues side.
Deviations of the lagged budget surplus from the -3% target are still negatively related to expenditures (although the coe¢ cient is lower after 1999) and positively related to total and tax revenues, meaning that the …scal rule is not being followed after the adoption of the EURO. In spite of knowing that this group of countries is not entirely homogeneous, to shed some light on present day state of a¤airs, we check for possible di¤erences of regime on public expenditures, total revenues and tax revenues between PIGS and the remaining Eurozone member states. The results are in Tables 2, 3 , and 4 -Equation (3).
PIGS vs Non-PIGS
Even though expenditures on both groups of countries respond positively to unemployment, the anti-cyclical reaction with respect to that variable is much stronger among non-PIGS, which we might interpret as an outcome from comparatively weaker public …nances as well as a symptom of the PIGS related inability to collect the necessary …nancial resources. As a matter of fact the standard deviation of the real GDP growth rate among PIGS exceeds 21 that among non-PIGS in about 40%, which is an indicator of more volatility of the tax base. Figure 1 also shows that, not only the level of government expenditures is greater among non-PIGS countries as a proportion of GDP, but also more correlated with the unemployment rate.
As mentioned before, whereas the tax rate responds positively to unemployment among non-PIGS, the situation is just the opposite when it comes to PIGS. However, this response is quite small, about -0.05 pp only. Our hypothesis to explain this …nding is again the association of a progressive tax system with the concentration of unemployment in lower income groups, but this time bearing in mind we are dealing with countries with lower percapita real and nominal incomes where poorer income groups make up a larger share of total population. A …nal critical di¤erence we might extract from the net-value of the estimated coe¢ cients for the unemployment rate on expenditures and revenues is that, as a whole, stabilization policies are much more e¤ective with non-PIGS than with PIGS. Therefore, the ability of this latter set of countries to control their economic cycles by themselves is rather weak and they mostly depend on the policies undertook by partner countries.
Regarding …scal rules, when we distinguish between the two sets of countries, deviations of the debt stock from the 60% target do not induce expenditure adjustments, but there is a positive reaction from tax revenues which, however, is so small that has no meaningful impact on total revenues whatsoever (see Equation (3) in Tables 1 and 3) . That is, this …scal rule is slightly obeyed on the taxation side but no e¤ort is made by governments on the expenditure side, which is very much what one feels from empirical 22 observation for the period under consideration. Nonetheless, the signi…cance of the variables (but not their signs) are reversed when we look at the whole sample, since then the adjustment is through expenditures and not through revenues. But then the estimated coe¢ cients are so close to each other and so small on both instances, around something between -0.05 and 0.03 pp, that we would better judge them as inconclusive, i.e., reasonable doubts remain about the existence of any type of adjustment whatsoever to this …scal rule, as well as to its possible channel; the only conclusion possible is that if any adjustment takes place at all, it is extremely feeble. We …nd no statistically signi…cant di¤erences of regime among both groups of nations concerning the deviations of the debt stock from the 60% target.
In relation to the deviations of the lagged one period budget surplus from the -3% target, we …nd no di¤erence of regime between PIGS and non-PIGS.
We come to the conclusion that PIGS, rather than showing more urgency than their more developed and structural stronger partner countries, have chosen instead to mimic the behavior of these rather than reinforcing their e¤orts.
Conclusions
The tests we have performed on the Eurozone countries, duly distinguishing between those that nowadays face seriously unbalanced public accounts and have already received o¢ cial aid from the Eurozone and the IMF, and those, It is now overtly recognized some important facts about the construction of the Eurozone, mainly: a) its intrinsic fragility since it never satis…ed the requisites of an optimum currency area; b) the overvaluation of some national currencies with respect to the Euro, as is the case of the Portuguese Escudo. Moreover, we could add the emphasis put on nominal convergence, as it is well exposed by the consistent abatement of the unemployment rate volatility after the common currency was introduced, instead of real convergence, among the partner countries based on the underlying assumption of asymmetric shocks instead of government similar behavior patterns. Finally, another conclusion which is potentially important is the …scal system now in place, considering its ability to function as an e¤ective instrument in pursuance of macroeconomic stabilization purposes and the eventual need for its overhaul accordingly.
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